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DOES RELIGION AFFECT ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
HAPPINESS? EVIDENCE FROM RAMADAN*
Filipe Campante and David Yanagizawa-Drott
We study the economic effects of religious practices in the context of the
observance of Ramadan fasting, one of the central tenets of Islam. To establish
causality, we exploit variation in the length of daily fasting due to the interac-
tion between the rotating Islamic calendar and a country’s latitude. We report
two key, quantitatively meaningful results: (i) longer Ramadan fasting has a
negative effect on output growth in Muslim countries, and (ii) it increases sub-
jective well-being among Muslims. We find evidence that these patterns are
consistent with a standard club good explanation for the emergence of costly
religious practices: increased strictness of fasting screens out the less commit-
ted members, while the more committed respond with an increase in their
relative levels of participation. Together, our results underscore that religious
practices can affect individual behavior and beliefs in ways that have negative
implications for economic performance, but that nevertheless increase subjec-
tive well-being among followers. JEL Codes: E20, O40, O43, Z12.
I. Introduction
Religions are ubiquitous across human societies. It is thus
natural to speculate that they may affect important economic
outcomes, such as economic growth—as many have done dating
at the very least to Weber’s (1930 [1905]) celebrated work. While
this possibility is certainly appealing, assessing its prevalence
and importance is a rather complicated task, both conceptually
and empirically, not the least because religions are multifaceted
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social phenomena whose different aspects could most likely have
different effects.
That said, one fundamental aspect that is common to all
forms of religion is that they prescribe rules of behavior, or prac-
tices, that constrain followers, with varying degrees of strictness.
First, religious practices impose an immediate trade-off, as they
require time and resources that are then unavailable for produc-
tion. Second, they could also directly affect productivity, for
instance by limiting social interactions with nonbelievers or by
imposing dietary restrictions. Third, they may shape beliefs and
values that determine economic decisions.
The recent empirical literature that has studied the relation-
ship between religion and economic performance—after years of
relative neglect from economists—has found a negative correla-
tion between religious behavior (e.g., attendance at religious ser-
vices) and economic growth (Barro and McCleary 2003; McCleary
and Barro 2006), and between religiosity and income at the cross-
country and individual levels (e.g., Barro and McCleary 2003).
However, as religious behavior and religiosity are endogenous
and could well be affected by economic growth itself, convincing
evidence that there is a causal effect driving these relationships
has proved elusive.1 This challenge is even thornier when it
comes to identifying the effects of the constraints on behavior
imposed by religious practices, since these should be understood
as equilibrium outcomes that can be affected by the economic
environment.
We present the first estimate of a causal effect of the strict-
ness of a religious practice on economic growth. We do so by fo-
cusing on the specific example of fasting in observance of the
Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Ramadan fasting is surely a
very prominent example of religious practice: as one of the Five
Pillars of Islam, its observance is understood to be obligatory for
all billion-plus Muslim believers. This religious practice has a
well-defined rule specifying that Muslims shall fast from dawn
to sunset, and as the month of Ramadan rotates over the seasons
according to the lunar calendar, it also provides us with an ideal
1. The causal identification challenge was obviously acknowledged by the lit-
erature. For instance, Barro and McCleary (2003) try to address it using instru-
mental variables (e.g., presence of a state religion). While reassuring with respect to
reverse causality, the limitations of their empirical setting do not let them deal with
omitted variables.
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context for dealing with the causal identification issues that con-
found the study of the links between religious practices and eco-
nomic outcomes.
To give a concrete example, when Ramadan falls in the
Northern Hemisphere winter, the prescribed length of daily fast-
ing according to the Qur’an will be longer in Bangladesh than in
Turkey, because Bangladesh is closer to the Equator. However,
when Ramadan falls in the summer, fasting will be longer in
Turkey than in Bangladesh. This interaction of latitude and the
cyclical properties of the lunar calendar being exogenous to our
outcomes of interest, we thus have an ideal source of idiosyncratic
variation in the prescribed strictness of the practice.
Using country-level panel data, we show that longer pre-
scribed Ramadan fasting has a robust negative effect on output
growth in Muslim countries, whether measured by GDP per
worker, GDP per capita, or total GDP, and whether measured in
yearly rates or aggregated up to five-year periods. Most reassur-
ingly, we find no effect whatsoever on GDP growth in non-Muslim
countries, underscoring that the result is unlikely to be spurious.
Quantitatively, our estimates imply a difference in growth
rates between Bangladesh and Turkey of the order of 1 percent-
age point, or about 0.15 standard deviation, at the peak and
trough of Ramadan fasting hours, at which the difference in the
lengths of fasting between the two countries is of 1.4 hours, or just
over 1 standard deviation. While the symmetry in the Ramadan
cycle implies that there is no divergence in performance over
time, our estimates imply a substantial economic cost stemming
from more demanding Ramadan fasting.
We then use the same empirical strategy to estimate the
causal effect of the strictness of Ramadan fasting on subjective
well-being (SWB). Using data from the World Values Survey, we
find that increased Ramadan fasting requirements lead Muslim
individuals to report greater levels of both happiness and life
satisfaction. Once again, we find no effect whatsoever on the
SWB of non-Muslim individuals in non-Muslim countries.
Our evidence thus indicates that exogenously requiring
Muslims to fast longer, for religious reasons, has a net positive
impact on their SWB: put simply, it makes them happier in spite
of making them relatively poorer. This is particularly interesting
since recent research has provided evidence that economic
growth leads to higher SWB at the cross-country level
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2008), in contrast with the well-known
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‘‘Easterlin paradox’’ (Easterlin 1974). Therefore, to the extent
that lower GDP growth causally reduces SWB, our results show
that this effect is trumped by the nonpecuniary benefits of the
practice on SWB.
To understand these results, we resort to the well-known
club good model of costly religious practices (Iannaccone 1992).
This framework provides a coherent explanation for the puzzling
existence and persistence of practices that are evidently costly
and with no apparent economic benefit, by showing that they
can improve the welfare of members of a religious community.
In essence, it shows that such practices may work as a mecha-
nism for screening out individuals who are less committed to
exerting effort within the community, as well as reducing the
threat of free-riding, thereby increasing the intensity of partici-
pation of remaining members and the provision of the club good
entailed by that religious engagement.
The evidence supports the predictions of this model. First, we
find that membership in voluntary religious organizations de-
creases as a result of the stricter Ramadan fasting requirements,
and this is in turn matched by increased membership in nonreli-
gious groups. This is consistent with a role of increased strictness
as a screening mechanism. Second, we find that individuals
whose demographic characteristics predict them to be less reli-
giously committed decrease their level of engagement as mea-
sured by mosque attendance. In contrast, the more committed
increase their engagement, as would result from the decreased
threat of free-riding.
We also find evidence that increased strictness affects beliefs,
in ways likely mediated by their effect on patterns of socializa-
tion. In particular, there is a negative effect of increased
Ramadan required fasting hours on generalized trust. Although
we cannot rule out other possible mechanisms linking increased
strictness and trust, this is consistent with the idea that religious
organizations may be especially effective in generating trust
(Putnam and Campbell 2010), and that the substitution of nonre-
ligious for religious engagement induced by the increased strict-
ness may have broader implications for social capital.
Last but not least, our results suggest that the impact of
Ramadan on economic growth is likely to go beyond the immedi-
ate effect of fasting on productivity. On the one hand, evidence on
employment and wages in manufacturing is consistent with an
impact on labor supply decisions—both directly and indirectly,
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via beliefs about the relative importance of work, which we also
show to be affected. In addition, to the extent that productivity
constitutes a channel of influence, the evidence that increased
fasting hours affects beliefs, such as trust, indicates that this
would operate over a longer span of time.
In sum, the case of Ramadan illustrates that religious prac-
tices can entail significant implications at the aggregate level,
while still providing measurable benefits, at least partly due to
their role as costly screening devices. This could well be true of
other kinds of religious activity that play a similar role. To be
sure, neither our results nor those of the extant literature
should be interpreted as implying that religion, broadly under-
stood, necessarily causes poor economic performance. Just as im-
portant, we focus on costly religious practices, and other aspects
of religion could have much different effects.2
Besides the aforementioned literature on religion and income
and growth, our article also relates to a number of additional
strands. First, we provide causal evidence in support of the club
good theory of costly religious practices, showing that exogenous
variation in strictness leads to screening, and changes in reli-
gious engagement, as predicted by the economic approach put
forth and surveyed by Iannaccone (1992, 1998). This is particu-
larly important given the alternative arguments to explain the
persistence of costly religious practices, ranging from psycholog-
ical (e.g., Plante and Sherman 2001) to evolutionary (e.g., Hinde
2010).
We also relate directly to the literature that has studied the
links between religion and SWB. It has typically found that reli-
gious engagement and religiosity are associated with higher
levels of SWB at the individual level (e.g., Ellison 1993; Dolan,
Peasgood, and White 2008; Deaton and Stone 2013). However,
whether such associations can be given a causal interpretation
remains very much an open question, as endogeneity issues pose
a fundamental challenge in this literature as well (Argyle 2003;
Francis 2011).3 Our contribution here is to provide evidence of
2. For instance, Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006)
find a positive relationship between economic growth and religious beliefs such as
belief in hell. For skeptical takes on this result, see Young (2009) and Durlauf,
Kourtellos, and Tan (2012).
3. Clingingsmith, Khwaja, and Kremer (2009) document that the Hajj pilgrim-
age to Mecca, another of the Five Pillars of Islam, leads to an increase in negative
feelings suggesting distress (for women only). However, they find no effect on
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that sort, though our source of variation is at the country level,
and also address the tension between the findings in this litera-
ture and those in the work focusing on religion and growth.
Others have studied the effects of adherence to different re-
ligions on a number of economic and political outcomes (Barro
1997; La Porta et al. 1999) or used survey evidence to study the
connection between religiosity and economic attitudes (Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales 2003).4 We differ in that we focus on a
specific example of religious practice, which lets us deal with the
issue of identifying a causal effect and considering specific mech-
anisms. More broadly, we build on the now vast literature docu-
menting the effects of culture—of which religion is certainly a
very important component—on a number of economic outcomes
(see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006 for an early survey, and
Nunn 2012 for a more recent discussion). Of note, we find evi-
dence of a causal effect of religious practices on trust, which sub-
stantiates the related strand that has studied that link (Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales 2003; Sosis 2005; Putnam and Campbell
2010; Berggren and Bjornskov 2011).
Our use of micro-evidence to study the impact of religion on
individual economic decisions also puts us in line with a recent
and growing literature that looks at specific topics such as
work ethic (Spenkuch 2011), entrepreneurship (Audretsch,
Boente, and Tamvada 2007), loan repayment decisions (Baele,
Farooq, and Ongena 2011), and human capital accumulation
(Becker and Woessmann 2009), among others. Within this liter-
ature, our article is closest to Clingingsmith, Khwaja, and
Kremer (2009), who study the impact of the Hajj. Consistent
with our evidence, they also find an important impact of this
practice on individual views and beliefs.
Last but not least, our article relates to a relatively small
literature in economics that has studied the effects of Ramadan
fasting. Almond and Mazumder (2011) use the variation of the
timing of Ramadan over the years to identify negative effects of
self-reported life satisfaction. Lim andPutnam (2010) argue for an effect of religious
engagement on SWB, using panel data to control for unobserved individual
characteristics.
4. In particular, those studies tend to find a negative coefficient for Muslim
adherence in regressions focusing on growth or institutional development. Our
results do not speak directly to that, since we focus on one specific aspect of
Islam. Kuran (2004) provides an extensive discussion of possible economic impli-
cations of Islamic institutions.
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fasting during early pregnancy on birth weight and long-term
disabilities. Van Ewijk (2011) and Majid (2013) use a similar
strategy to study effects on individual long-run health and
labor market outcomes. Besides their focus on individual out-
comes, the nature of the variation used by these studies (entirely
within-country) precludes the use of the interaction between
timing and latitude, which affords us cleaner identification.
Still, that evidence points at the possibility of long-run economic
costs of fasting (at least as it pertains to pregnant women), which
lies beyond the scope of what we study.
On a different vein in this literature, Schofield (2014) uses
variation in the timing of Ramadan relative to the agricultural
season, interacted with Muslim presence across Indian districts,
to estimate a negative effect of Ramadan fasting on agricultural
output. This is broadly consistent with our findings, though that
paper attributes the effect to the direct effect of fasting on nutri-
tion and productivity. However, her source of variation does not
relate to the strictness of the practice, and her paper focuses only
on labor supply and productivity reactions in the very short run,
namely, during the month itself. This precludes an analysis of the
kind of responses this article studies.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section
II lays out some background on Ramadan practices, Section III
describes the data and empirical strategy, and Section IV pre-
sents the basic results on growth and SWB. Section V then dis-
cusses the evidence on mechanisms, and Section VI concludes.
II. Background
Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic ( Hijri) calendar,
and is considered sacred as the month in which the Prophet
Muhammad first received revelations. Fasting ( sawm) during
that month is one of the Five Pillars of Islam—the five basic
acts that are considered an obligation for all believers and the
foundation of Muslim life. The fasting encompasses abstention
from food and drink, as well as smoking and sexual activities,
between dawn and sunset during the entire month.5
5. There are exemptions from the obligation, typically for children, the ill and
the elderly, travelers, and breastfeeding women.
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Ramadan fasting entails obvious physiological consequences
because of the constraints it places on the ingestion of food and
liquids, and these have been extensively studied in the medical
literature. Not surprisingly, the literature has consistently found
body weight loss and significant metabolic changes (e.g., Hallak
and Nomani 1988; Ziaee et al. 2006). In addition, Leiper, Molla,
and Molla (2003) summarize the research as finding symptoms
such as irritability, headaches, sleep deprivation, and lassitude
being commonly reported, although with few major health
problems.
More broadly, it stands to reason that these effects would
have potential implications for productivity at work. Indeed, re-
search has found significant prevalence of individuals reporting
tiredness and unwillingness to work, as well as reduced levels of
activity and concentration ability, during the month of Ramadan
(Afifi 1997; Karaagaoglu and Yucecan 2000). More specific stud-
ies focusing on worker productivity in heavy labor activities have
also found ‘‘evidence of [. . .] substantial health hazard to Islamic
workers in such situations,’’ going as far as ‘‘strongly [urging]
employers to refrain from assigning Islamic workers to heat
work or heavy daytime work during Ramadan’’ (Schmahl and
Metzler 1991). In short, there is strong indication that
Ramadan fasting affects followers in ways that affect their pro-
ductivity at work, although any negative effects seem unlikely to
persist beyond the fasting period (Toda and Morimoto 2004).
Consistent with that, a recent survey on the impact of
Ramadan on productivity (Dinar Standard 2011) finds that up
to one in four Muslim professionals admits to not maintaining
the same level of productivity compared with other months.
No less important are the broader effects of Ramadan on in-
dividual lifestyle and social life during the holy month (Maqsood
2007; Marshall Cavendish Corporation 2010). The daily routine
incorporates major predawn ( suhur) and fast-breaking ( iftar)
meals, which are social events involving family, friends and ac-
quaintances, and coworkers—turning iftar in particular into a
‘‘unique opportunity for socializing’’ (Chenar 2011). Iftar events
often take place in mosques, which, more broadly, typically hold
many special events throughout the month. As a result of this,
and of the additional tarawih prayers that are meant to be per-
formed on Ramadan evenings (beyond the five daily prayers that
are another Pillar of Islam), increased mosque-going is an
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important feature of the period.6 Major festivities also mark the
end of the month, with the fast-breaking festival of Eid al-Fitr.
Not all Ramadan practices are of a social nature, of course.
Indeed, the (optional) ritual of i’tekaf (‘‘staying in one place’’) is a
traditional part of the last 10 days of the month, and reading the
Qur’an is also strongly encouraged. Consistent with that, for in-
stance, Afifi (1997) reports that fasting individuals tend to get
more involved in ‘‘stress-reducing’’ (such as watching TV, listen-
ing to radio, or visiting friends) and ‘‘spiritual’’ activities (such as
praying and reading the Qur’an).
Given all of these unique features and practices that take
place during the holy month, one might expect that Ramadan
would affect individual decisions and the formation of economi-
cally relevant beliefs in ways that could in turn extend the impact
of Ramadan beyond the month itself.
Obviously, adherence to each specific Ramadan practice will
vary tremendously across individuals and countries, and this is
very hard to observe on a systematic basis. However, our empir-
ical strategy takes advantage of factors that will exogenously
shock the strictness of the fasting requirement to identify the
impact of the practice on our outcomes of interest.
Our strategy, as we discuss later in greater detail, is based on
the fact that the Islamic calendar is lunar, so that months corre-
spond to lunar cycles (around 29.5 days). As a result, the year is
10 to 11 days shorter than the solar year and, in the absence of
leap years, the months rotate over the seasons accordingly, in
cycles of roughly 33 years. This means that the number of
hours of daily fasting—corresponding to the period between
dawn and sunset—will vary depending on the time of the year
in which Ramadan happens to fall in any given year and also on
latitude.
Longer hours obviously amplify the physiological impact of
going without food and drink and of the fewer hours of sleep that
come from having to wake up for predawn meals. Just as impor-
tant, dealing with that impact requires changes in daily routines
and activities that affect the broader lifestyle changes we have
6. Tarawih prayers are not mandatory, but are considered highly desirable
nonetheless. They should preferably be performed in a mosque congregation, but
can also be done at home.
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discussed.7 As a result, the length of required fasting hours con-
stitutes an ideal source of variation in the strictness of Ramadan
practices.
III. Empirical Framework
III.A. Data
Our first key variable is the number of stipulated fasting
hours during Ramadan.8 To calculate that, we collect data from
the Astronomical Applications Department of the U.S. Naval
Observatory. Their online data service provides sunrise and
sunset times for any geographic coordinate on Earth, at any
given date in the Gregorian calendar. To map historical
Ramadan dates from the Islamic calendar to the Gregorian cal-
endar, we use data from Islamic Philosophy Online.9 For each
Ramadan since 1950, we calculate the average daily daylight
hours during Ramadan in every country and year.10
7. Indeed, it is not hard to find reports underscoring that point in the context of
summer Ramadans. They seem to entail more time spent with family, in worship,
and in contemplative activities, as well as a general ‘‘slowdown’’ in daily activities so
as to conserve energy and avoid the ill effects of heat and humidity. For instance, a
Canadian report (Escott 2013) quotes individuals stating that to withstand the long
fasting hours of summer Ramadans they tend to ‘‘[spend] time with [. . .] family at
the mosque where they read from the Koran,’’ to ‘‘read more of the Koran,’’ to ‘‘[stay]
busy helping out at home and being involved in [community programs],’’ and to
‘‘spend more time in active worship and prayer [to take their] mind off it.’’ The
impact is not felt only at higher latitudes, however, as exemplified by reports on
challenging summer Ramadans in Egypt (‘‘a fast to test all our willpower’’; al
Shalchi 2010) or Saudi Arabia (Mohammed 2013). More directly, the long hours
also seem associated with a greater crowding out of work activities, as ‘‘the working
day shortens by two or three hours’’ (The Economist 2010).
8. The Online Appendix provides descriptive statistics for all the variables
used in the analysis.
9. Available at http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/hijri.htm.
10. To keep things simple, we use a country’s capital as the coordinates of in-
terest, downloaded from http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. This
obviously induces some measurement error in our data. Similarly, the Qur’an spe-
cifies that fasting should start at dawn (first light), whereas we measure the start
exactly at sunrise, and this subtle difference may therefore introduce some minor
measurement error. Moreover, in some Muslim societies fasting does not start until
the new crescent moon of Ramadan has been sighted. Since these deviations are
likely idiosyncratic, measurement error is likely to be classical and would lead to
attenuation bias in ourestimates. Thesunrise andsunset patterns of Mecca are also
sometimes followed, especially at very high latitudes, but this choice is evidently
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We then match the data on Ramadan fasting hours with var-
ious data sets. For the Muslim share of a country’s population, we
use data from Version 1.1 of the World Religion Project (WRP)
(Maoz and Henderson 2013), which contains information about
the number of adherents in each of the states in the international
system, for every half-decade period between 1945 and 2010. We
generate a yearly panel via interpolation, for the years between
WRP years, and extrapolation, for years after 2010 and before a
country’s independence.
Data on economic growth comes from the Penn World Tables
8.0 (PWT8.0) (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2013), resulting in
an unbalanced panel of 167 countries between 1950 and 2011.
Our main outcome of interest comes from national-accounts
data on real GDP growth per worker, in constant 2005 prices.
(We also consider growth in real GDP and real GDP per capita,
for robustness.) Since the variation in fasting hours that we use is
at a yearly level, we focus on year-on-year growth.
To asses whether Ramadan affects SWB, we use data from all
six waves of the World Values Survey (WVS). The surveys were
conducted from 1981 to 2014 in 97 countries, totaling more than
330,000 interviews, of which about 72,000 are with individuals
self-identifying as Muslim, living in 83 countries. We use the
two key standard measures of SWB. First, ‘‘Feeling of
Happiness’’ is a hedonic measure taken from the answer to the
question: ‘‘Taking all things together, would you say you are: not
at all happy, not very happy, quite happy, very happy?’’ We con-
struct the standard indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent
answers ‘‘quite happy’’ or ‘‘very happy,’’ and 0 otherwise. The
second measure, ‘‘Life Satisfaction,’’ is more evaluative, based
on the question: ‘‘How satisfied are you with your life as a
whole these days?’’ (on a numerical 10-point scale). We construct
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the answer is above 5, and also
present results using the raw number. The survey also contains
information on beliefs and values, and measures of religious
engagement, all of which we will describe as they enter our
discussion.
endogenous and we thus leave it aside. Last, we could have used the total number of
fasting hours required over a given year, but the difference would be absorbed by
the year fixed effects, leaving our results unchanged.
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III.B. Identification Strategy and Specifications
Our identification strategy exploits the fact that the number
of daylight hours during Ramadan will vary differentially across
countries over time, because the Islamic calendar follows the
lunar cycle, with no leap years. There are two key factors that
interact to give rise to arguably idiosyncratic and exogenous var-
iation in Ramadan fasting hours. First, there is the timing of the
start of Ramadan: in years when Ramadan is held during
summer months, the sun is up for longer, and fasting hours
as stipulated by the Qur’an increase accordingly. Second, the
geographical location of the country, and more specifically its
latitude, also matters: it is the primary determinant of sunrise
and sunset times at any given date. During summer Ramadan
the hours will be longer the further away from the Equator,
whereas during winter Ramadan the relationship is reversed.
As long as we control for year and country fixed effects, we auto-
matically control for any possible independent effects of Ramadan
timing and country latitude. We are then left with the variation
due to the interaction of the two factors, and this is what we
exploit.
To illustrate the nature of that variation, we first show, in
Figure I, a map highlighting the countries in the PWT8.0 accord-
ing to the share of Muslims in the population. We can see that
there is substantial variation in latitude among countries with
relatively large Muslim populations, in spite of there being none
in very high latitudes.
Figure II illustrates the way latitude and timing interact in
affecting stipulated fasting, to provide visual intuition for the
variation we use for identification. It plots for every year the av-
erage daily fasting hours for three countries, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, and Turkey. There is within-country variation over
time, but most important is the fact that the time variation is
different across the three countries. Compare first Bangladesh,
which is roughly at the average latitude for the subsample of
Muslim-majority countries, to Turkey, which has one of the high-
est latitudes in that sample. Bangladesh has shorter fasting
hours when Ramadan falls during the Northern Hemisphere
summer (as in the early 1950s and 1980s), and the opposite hap-
pens when it falls in the winter months (as in the mid-1960s or
late 1990s/early 2000s). Indonesia in turn illustrates yet another
source of idiosyncratic variation, coming from the fact that
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seasons are reversed in the Southern Hemisphere.11 Note also
that the further from the Equator, the greater the amplitude of
variation.
Finally, Figure III shows the implications when we take the
sample of Muslim countries as a whole: the average daily length
of Ramadan fasting fluctuates according to the Northern
Hemisphere seasons, since that is where the vast majority of
Muslim countries are, and the variation around the average (as
measured by the lines marking the 20th and 80th percentiles of
the hours distribution bands) peaks on December and June
Ramadans.
We can implement this identification strategy by estimating
the following equation:
gct ¼   RamadanHoursct þ c þ t þ "ct;ð1Þ
FIGURE II
Daily Ramadan Fasting Hours, Three Countries
Each line represents the average daily number of sunrise-to-sunset
hours during the month of Ramadan in each year, measured in each country’s
capital.
11. Note that all curves cross when Ramadan falls around the vernal or autum-
nal equinoxes, when days and nights are of equal length.
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where g is an outcome (e.g., real GDP per worker growth) in
country c in year t, RamadanHours is the logged average daily
number of fasting hours during Ramadan, and  and  capture
country and year fixed effects, respectively.12
The country fixed effects account for all time-invariant dif-
ferences across countries, such as geography or cultural factors
that do not vary over time. The year fixed effects in turn control
for factors that vary across time but are constant across
FIGURE III
Daily Ramadan Fasting Hours in Muslim Countries (PWT)
Each line represents the average daily number of sunrise-to-sunset hours
during the month of Ramadan in each year, for different parts of the distribu-
tion among countries with at least 75% Muslim population share (29 countries,
unbalanced panel). The solid line is the mean, while the dashed lines represent
the 20th and 80th percentiles. The boxes at the top indicate which month
Ramadan starts in. The graph shows that most of the within-year variation
in fasting hours occurs during summer and winter Ramadan (June and
December), while there is no variation when Ramadan is held in equinox
months (March and September).
12. We should stress that what we estimate, as indicated by equation (1), is the
marginal effect of increasing the number of Ramadan fasting hours. We cannot
estimate an effect against a counterfactual where Ramadan is absent—a linear
extrapolation to zero hours would be patently absurd. In the Online Appendix we
also show that the results are essentially identical when using hours in levels
rather than logs.
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countries, such as global business cycles or the time of the year
when Ramadan happens to be held. Together, they let us focus on
the idiosyncratic variation we have described.13 We also present
results controlling for linear country trends and population
growth, although by assumption this would not be necessary
since population growth is uncorrelated with Ramadan fasting
hours. Still, this may reduce residual variation, leading to more
precise estimates. We do not control for other economic factors
because they may be endogenous to Ramadan fasting.
We would expect Ramadan fasting requirements to meaning-
fully affect economic growth only in countries that have a sub-
stantial share of Muslim population. For this reason, we estimate
equation (1) in the subsample of countries with clear Muslim ma-
jorities. We define the subsample using the 75%-Muslim thresh-
old, which we base on the average over the available period to
obtain a balanced panel.14
To further probe how the effect varies with the relative size of
the Muslim population, we also estimate an interaction specifica-
tion over the entire sample:
gct¼ðRamadanHoursctÞðMuslimctÞþlðRamadanHoursctÞ
þ Xct 0 þcþtþ"ct;ð2Þ
where Muslim is the share of Muslims in the population, and X is
a vector of covariates consisting of flexible controls of the Muslim
population share, Muslim-by-year fixed effects which control for
any yearly shocks that might differentially affect countries de-
pending on the size of their Muslim population, and country
trends. Again, if Ramadan fasting truly affects economic out-
comes, we would expect l=0, as no true aggregate effect should
be detected when Muslims are a vanishingly small minority.
Finally, since the effect of longer Ramadan may not be linear in
13. It is worth noting that there is meaningful residual variation in Ramadan
fasting hours: the fixed effects account for 36% of the variation across all countries
and years.
14. Specifically, using the average measure prevents countries that hover
around the threshold from dropping in and out of the sample in different years.
As an example, Senegal is recorded as having increased its Muslim share from
about 73% in 1950 to about 83% in 1970 and up to 94% by 2010. Those early years
would have been left out of the subsample, quite arbitrarily, if we were to use the
variation over time; by using the time average (of about 84%), we make sure that all
years are included. The results are robust to this alternative definition (available on
request).
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the Muslim population share, we also present results with flexi-
ble interactions.
When it comes to SWB, we can exploit the individual dimen-
sion of the survey data, with the following specification:
yict ¼   RamadanHoursict þ c þ t þ Xict 0 þ "ict;ð3Þ
where subscript i denotes individual i living in country c surveyed
in year t, and Xict is a vector of demographic controls, again in the
spirit of reducing residual variation and increasing precision.15
We estimate this equation on the sample of individuals who
are presumably ‘‘treated’’ by Ramadan fasting: those who self-
identify in the survey as Muslims. Of course, not all Muslims
will fully comply with the formal fasting hours, and the choice
of whether to do so is evidently endogenous.16 Our estimates thus
capture the reduced-form effects of formally prescribed fasting
hours, including on those who choose not to comply as a result
of that increase. Given that our primary interest is the average
causal effect among Muslims of an increase in the strictness of the
practice, part of which may operate precisely by inducing changes
in compliance, these regressions will actually provide us with the
desired estimates.
The focus on Muslim individuals, rather than countries, also
means that we can actually use information from a broader set of
countries. In particular, we now have additional variation in
latitude at our disposal, as can be readily seen from Figure IV,
depicting the size of samples coming from each country in the
case of the latest wave of WVS (Wave 6).
Another important factor to keep in mind when interpreting
our results is the timing of the survey. The actual dates of the
interviews are only recorded in the data for Wave 6, and hence
we cannot apply our empirical strategy: the only variation
in Ramadan fasting hours we would have would be in the cross-
section of countries and with a rather small sample. Not being
able to use the specific timing, we define RamadanHours as the
log number of fasting hours during the most recent Ramadan
15. The controls are gender dummy, second-order polynomial in age, marital
status dummies, number of children, and education dummies.
16. According to survey evidence from Dinar Standard (2011), from five Muslim
countries (Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates) and
five countries where Muslims are a minority (United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, India, Australia), 98% of Muslims report fasting during Ramadan.
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preceding the survey year.17 It is safe to assume that the vast
majority of the data points will lie outside of the month of
Ramadan: in Wave 6, less than 1% of the Muslims in the
sample were interviewed during Ramadan. It follows that our
results should not be interpreted as pertaining to SWB during
the holy month only.
Finally, we note that all of our specifications will report stan-
dard errors clustered at the country level to allow for the possi-
bility that the error term might be correlated for different
observations within a country—particularly since fasting hours
vary smoothly from one year to the next. We also present, for
robustness, results with two-way clustering by country and by
year (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011).
IV. Basic Results
IV.A. Effects on Economic Growth
Table I presents the results on economic growth, starting
with the subsample of Muslim countries. Column (1) shows a
simple regression of real per worker GDP growth on (log)
Ramadan fasting hours. The estimate is negative and statistically
significant, implying that country-year pairs with long fasting
hours tend to have on average lower growth rates. Column (2)
then includes country fixed effects, to control for factors that
affect growth and also covary with country latitude. We see a
similar negative coefficient, implying that for a given country,
years with summer Ramadan display on average lower growth.
Column (3) includes year fixed effects instead, to control for
growth determinants that also covary with the timing of
Ramadan. Here the estimate implies that in any given year
(and thus conditional on when Ramadan occurs), countries with
longer fasting hours grow more slowly on average. The estimated
coefficient is actually larger in magnitude, suggesting that focus-
ing on the within-country variation—namely, the variation
across seasons—if anything underestimates the true negative
effect of stricter fasting.
Column (4) then displays our benchmark specification, as in
equation (1), including both year and country fixed effects. The
17. The results are essentially identical if we use the hours in the survey year
itself (results available on request).
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estimate is again statistically significant (=0.127, p = .002),
very similar in magnitude, and shows that Ramadan fasting
has a negative effect on real per worker GDP growth. Column
(5) shows that controlling for population growth does not affect
the point estimate, and column (6) shows the same is true when
we additionally control for linear country trends.
We then present the interaction specification, following
equation (2), in column (7). The estimate on (log) Ramadan
hours captures the estimated effect for a country where
Muslims are a vanishingly small minority. Reassuringly, we
find a coefficient that is very small and statistically insignificant,
enhancing confidence in our empirical strategy. In contrast, the
interaction coefficient shows that the effect of Ramadan fasting is
present in countries with relatively large Muslim populations,
with a magnitude that is consistent with the subsample
estimates.
This specification imposes that the Muslim share of the pop-
ulation has a linear effect on the size of the impact of Ramadan
fasting. It could very well be the case that the effect is nonlinear
instead. To explore that possibility, column (8) implements a
modified version of specification (2) in which we consider the pos-
sible heterogeneity of the effect across groups of countries with
different levels of Muslim presence. Specifically, we estimate sep-
arate interaction coefficients between (log) Ramadan hours and
dummies for whether a country falls within the 0%, 0–25%,
25–50%, 50–75%, or 75–100% ranges in terms of Muslim share
of the population.
The results of this nnolinear specification can be seen graph-
ically in Figure V, which depicts the implied coefficient on (log)
Ramadan hours for each of the Muslim share bins, along with
95% confidence intervals. Once again, we find that the effect of
Ramadan fasting in countries with small Muslim minorities
(below 25%) is quite precisely estimated at around zero.18 In con-
trast, we find a sizable and significantly negative effect exactly for
the countries with at least 75% Muslim share, further underscor-
ing our choice for the subsample threshold. We estimate a sizable
coefficient for places with a smaller Muslim majority, but with
18. In light of this pattern, we take the 25% threshold as delimiting the ‘‘control
group’’ in a series of placebo specifications reported in the Online Appendix. We find
no significant effect across the board.
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low precision most likely due to the relatively small number of
countries within that range.19
Our results are robust to a wide variety of checks, which we
report in the Online Appendix. First, the estimates are robust to
two-way clustering of the standard errors, by country and by
year. The estimates are also statistically significant when using
a lower % Muslims sample inclusion threshold. The coefficient
generally decreases in magnitude as the threshold is lowered,
which is unsurprising given that countries where a smaller
share of the population are fasting are gradually included. We
then show that the results also hold when using growth in GDP
FIGURE V
The Effects of Ramadan Hours on Economic Growth, Nonlinear Estimates
The figure plots the estimated effects of longer Ramadan fasting hours, at
different Muslim population shares. For each category, it is the linear combi-
nation of the main coefficient and the corresponding interaction coefficient in
Table I, column (8). The vertical bars represent the 95% confidence intervals.
The figure shows that longer Ramadan fasting hours have no significant effect
on real GDP per worker growth in countries with small Muslim minorities, but
a negative and statistically significant effect in countries with a large Muslim
majority (>75%).
19. Only Albania, Brunei, Chad, and Sudan are in the 50–75% range for the
entire sample period, with a handful of other countries being there for a subset of
years.
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levels or in GDP per capita as the measure of economic perfor-
mance, though the coefficients are slightly smaller and less pre-
cisely estimated.
The results are not driven by outliers either, as we show
visually in the Online Appendix by plotting the outcome residuals
against log Ramadan hours residuals from the baseline specifica-
tion. Alternatively, we also show that the results are unchanged
when we drop each Muslim country from the sample, one at a
time: the coefficients are very stable, and statistically significant.
By the same token, the log specification does not seem to matter:
the results are very similar in specifications with Ramadan fast-
ing hours in levels.
Our next step is to consider the possibility that results could
be somehow affected by convergence or mean reversion. To deal
with that, we include lagged (log) GDP on the right-hand side of
our specifications, to account for convergence. Since there are
substantial econometric challenges in estimating the rate of con-
vergence, especially in the presence of country fixed effects, we
control for lagged income while imposing that it falls within the
confines established by the growth literature (Barro 2012).
Specifically, we allow for the rate of convergence to be right at
the level of the ‘‘iron law of convergence’’ (2% a year) or at the
lower and upper bounds (1.7% and 2.4%, respectively). In addi-
tion, following standard practice in the growth literature, we also
collapse our data in blocks of five years (and also two, three, or
four) so as to filter out noise in the yearly variation. In our case,
the main variable of interest varies slowly and predictably over
time, which is another reason to consider the results with the
collapsed data.20
We show in the Online Appendix that the results are robust
to different combinations of these procedures, both in the statis-
tical significance and quantitative senses, as we can see by com-
parison with the baseline estimates that are reported in the first
column. This includes specifications with the log of GDP per
worker as the dependent variable, as opposed to the growth
20. To avoid needlessly throwing away relevant variation, we define the blocks
so as to minimize the variation in fasting hours within them. We then average
Ramadan hours over the period. We have checked the results for blocks of up to
eight years, and they are robust. We do not report these results for the sake of
keeping tables relatively uncluttered, but they are available on request.
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rate, with and without the use of standard dynamic panel meth-
ods to account for persistence.
We also consider robustness to the possibility of terms of
trade shocks. We control for measures of export and import
prices (from the PWT8.0) to account comprehensively for the pos-
sibility that the evolution of terms of trade—encompassing com-
modity price shocks or similar developments—could confound our
results. The results are indeed robust, with coefficient sizes again
very much in line with our baseline results.
Another interesting question that we investigate in the
Online Appendix is whether there is any asymmetry between
the effects of longer Ramadan fasting hours in summer versus
winter. It could be the case that the increase in strictness is more
binding in summer months, when the hours get especially long
and the heat makes fasting presumably more difficult. We check
for that possibility by interacting Ramadan hours with a dummy
for ‘‘summer’’ months—namely, the three months in the year
with longest daylight hours: May–July in the Northern
Hemisphere, and November–January in the South. We find
that the interaction coefficient is insignificant and quite small
once we control for country and year fixed effects. This suggests
that there is little evidence for such asymmetric effects: an in-
crease in fasting hours seems about as costly in the summer as in
the rest of the year.21
In sum, we find robust evidence of a causal effect of longer
Ramadan fasting on economic growth. Quite important, the esti-
mated magnitudes are also robust and quantitatively meaning-
ful. The last row in Table I shows that a 1 standard deviation
increase (in the sample of Muslim countries) in Ramadan fasting
hours, of roughly 10%, induces a decrease in economic growth of
around one-sixth of a standard deviation.
21. More generally, the variation in Ramadan fasting hours could also be partly
capturing the effect of temperature, as the latter is naturally correlated. This is not
a problem as far as our analysis is concerned, since the effects of temperature would
also constitute meaningful variation in the strictness of the fasting practice. Still, if
we control for the countrywide typical average temperature in the month in which
Ramadan starts, the coefficient on fasting hours remains very similar and statisti-
cally significant, while temperature has no significant effect. (These results are
available on request.) This indicates that the increase in strictness associated
with fasting hours per se, rather than due to temperature, is what is driving the
results.
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To translate these magnitudes into a more concrete example,
consider the comparison between Bangladesh and Turkey. Our
benchmark estimate from column (4) implies that the average per
worker growth rate in Bangladesh at the height of the (Northern)
summer Ramadan cycle would be just over 1 percentage point
greater than that of Turkey. Turkey happens to have longer
summer fasting hours by an amount roughly equal to 1 standard
deviation of the variation experienced over the Ramadan cycle by
the average Muslim country in our sample—which in fact corre-
sponds roughly to the latitude of Bangladesh. (For the sake of
comparison with the preexisting literature on religious practices
and growth, Barro and McCleary 2003 find that a 1 standard
deviation increase in monthly church attendance is associated
with a decrease of about 1.1 percentage points in the growth
rate.) In contrast, of course, growth in Bangladesh would be
just over 1 percentage point lower than in Turkey over the
winter Ramadan years. Although this symmetry implies that
there is no divergence in performance over time, it is clear that
our estimates imply a substantial economic cost stemming from
more demanding Ramadan fasting.
IV.B. Effects on Subjective Well-Being
We now turn to the SWB results. Table II presents the
results on the two key self-reported measures, happiness and
life satisfaction. When estimating the effects on the first measure
for all Muslims in the sample (columns (1) and (2)), the coeffi-
cients are positive and highly statistically significant ( p< .001),
indicating that Ramadan fasting increases measured SWB for
Muslim individuals.
Columns (3) and (4) then estimate the effects separately for
men and women. The coefficients are significant and positive for
both sexes, with a point estimate of slightly larger magnitude
for women. Column (5) in turn shows that the results are robust
to running an ordered logit regression where the dependent vari-
able is the four-category answer to the happiness question.
Columns (6)–(10) then present the results for the same exercise,
using life satisfaction as the dependent variable. We see results
that are qualitatively very similar to those for happiness, though
the effect is generally larger from a quantitative perspective.
The results are robust to two-way clustering of the standard
errors and controls for country-specific trends, as shown in the
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Online Appendix. We also show there that the estimates are not
driven by outlier observations or individual countries and that
the results are essentially the same if we use Ramadan fasting
hours in levels rather than logs.
As an alternative to the individual-level variation, and since
the variation in Ramadan fasting hours is at the country level, we
also aggregate the data up to that level. In other words, we com-
pute the average value of the SWB measures, and run specifica-
tions analogous to equations (1) and (2). In the former case, we
take the average over the subsample of Muslim (or non-Muslim)
individuals; in the latter case, we take it over the entire sample.
In the Online Appendix we show that the results are robust to
this specification: a significant positive effect is present only for
the average SWB of Muslim individuals.
The quantitative implications of the SWB results are also
meaningful, as was the case with GDP. The estimates imply
that our aforementioned thought experiment comparing Bangla-
desh and Turkey would imply that in summer Ramadans, Turk-
ish Muslims would be about 5 percentage points likelier to report
they are happy. This corresponds to a standardized effect of about
0.15 that is similar to what we found for GDP.
In short, and keeping in mind that the vast majority of our
survey respondents were not being interviewed during the holy
month, our results mean that Muslims report feeling significantly
happier and more satisfied with their lives after Ramadans with
long required fasting hours, even though Ramadan fasting has an
important material cost in Muslim countries.
V. Discussion
Our central results are very clear. First, longer Ramadan
fasting has a robust, statistically significant, and quantitatively
important negative effect on economic growth in Muslim
countries. This is very much in line with the correlation patterns
previously found in the literature that has looked at the links
between religious practices and economic growth, and quantita-
tively our estimates imply an effect of religious practices that
is about the size found, for instance, in Barro and McCleary
(2003).
Second, longer Ramadan fasting has a robust, statistically
significant, and quantitatively important positive effect on SWB
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reported by Muslim individuals. This seems consistent with the
extant literature on religion and happiness, but is in fact in ten-
sion with the previous result on growth: since what we measure is
a net effect on SWB, our evidence indicates that Muslims are
happier in spite of being poorer. Any negative effect of reduced
GDP growth and material living standards on SWB is therefore
trumped by the nonpecuniary benefits of a longer or more intense
prescribed religious practice.
The key remaining question is how we can understand
the underlying mechanisms driving these results, especially
what explains the diverging effects on economic performance
and SWB.
V.A. Costly Religious Practices
A natural explanation starts from the celebrated model of
religious activity as a club good, put forth by Iannaccone (1992)
to explain the emergence and persistence of economically costly
religious practices. Although that model has most often been
applied to understand the behavior of relatively smaller
nonmainstream religious groups (‘‘sects,’’ in standard sociological
parlance) (e.g., Iannaccone 1994; Berman 2000), the logic can
naturally be applied to an example of a widespread religious prac-
tice, such as those associated with Ramadan fasting, that is both
costly and largely visible.
The key idea is that the utility an individual derives from her
religious activities is increasing in the engagement of her fellow
worshipers. This club good feature gives rise to a standard free-
riding problem, and hence to underprovision of the religious ac-
tivity, from the perspective of the group, because individuals fail
to take into account the benefit that their engagement provides to
the other members.
As a result, increasing the strictness and cost of the practices
associated with a religious group can improve the welfare of its
members in two ways. First, it may increase the relative cost of
engaging in activities outside the group. In the example of
Ramadan, the fasting itself means that it is harder to socialize
with noncompliers—since many opportunities for socializing nat-
urally involve food and drink—and the other activities associated
with the holy month (tarawih prayers, iftar meals, and so on) take
up time that thus cannot be used to be around one’s non-Muslim
friends or acquaintances. Because of that, under certain
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conditions, increasing the strictness of the practices required
from group membership will increase the welfare of group mem-
bers (Iannaccone 1992, Proposition 1).
Second, but just as important, strict practices work as
a screening device to keep out relatively less committed mem-
bers or potential members. If individuals are heterogeneous
with respect to their preferences regarding religious activity,
then as long as those who are less inclined to participate are
sufficiently numerous, there will be a separating equilibrium
in which the more committed sort into a group that requires
strict sacrifices from their members, while the less committed
sort out into less demanding groups (Iannaccone 1992,
Proposition 2).
The combination of these forces naturally fits the general
pattern established by our basic results: increasing the strictness
of fasting requirements is economically costly, as demonstrated
by the impact on economic performance, but can nevertheless be
associated with increased SWB.22 Most important, the frame-
work generates testable predictions that we can take to the
data to assess the empirical content of this explanation for the
basic results.
Membership and Engagement. We first check the impact of
increased fasting requirements on patterns of membership in re-
ligious groups. The WVS lists several types of voluntary organi-
zations, one of which is ‘‘church or religious organization,’’ and
asks the respondent whether she is an ‘‘active member,’’ an ‘‘in-
active member,’’ or ‘‘not a member’’ of organizations of each of
those types. We code dummy variables equal to 1 if the individual
describes herself as an active member of the corresponding type.
Table III displays the results. Columns (1) and (2) show that
longer Ramadan hours have a negative effect on active member-
ship of religious organizations, with and without controlling for
individual demographic characteristics.23 Quantitatively, the
standardized effect is about 0.15, again of the same order as the
22. In this we are implicitly assuming that measures of reported SWB are in-
dicative of or at least a proxy for welfare in a broader sense. For a discussion of the
extent to which those measures relate to welfare, see Benjamin et al. (2012).
23. Those characteristics are age, age squared, number of children, marital
status dummies, education level dummies, and a gender dummy, plus income,
social class, and size of town dummies.
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results for GDP and SWB. Columns (3) and (4) in turn show that
this behavior is mirrored by an increase in membership of nonre-
ligious organizations, essentially of the same magnitude, such
that the likelihood of being an active member of an organization
of any kind is unaffected (columns (5) and (6)).24
In other words, increasing the strictness of the Ramadan
fasting requirement reduces membership of Muslim individuals
in religious groups and induces a corresponding increase in mem-
bership of other kinds of organizations. This is exactly what one
would expect when a costly religious practice works as a screen-
ing device.
We can further explore the nature of the response by
considering the evidence on religious engagement, as measured
by frequency of attendance at religious services, in Table IV.25
TABLE III
THE EFFECTS ON MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS AND NONRELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mosque or other
religious organization
Nonreligious
organization
Any
organization
Log(Ramadan hours) 0.463*** 0.530*** 0.423* 0.443** 0.158 0.204
(0.127) (0.119) (0.216) (0.181) (0.178) (0.137)
Observations 43,777 42,904 42,771 42,078 43,056 42,330
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.25
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Standardized effect 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.05
Notes. Individual-level outcome data from the World Values Survey, 1981–2014. All individuals in the
sample are Muslims, from all countries in the data. The dependent variables are dummies, indicating
active membership in a religious organization (columns (1)–(2)), nonreligious organization (columns (3)–
(4)), or any organization (columns (5)–(6)). Ramadan hours is the average number of sunrise to sunset
hours during the month of Ramadan in the year preceding the survey, in the country’s capital. The
baseline controls are age, age squared, number of children, marital status dummies, education level
dummies, and a gender dummy. The additional controls are dummies for social class (upper class,
upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, lower class), income class (10 steps), and population
size of town of residence (eight categories). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the coun-
try level. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .1.
24. ‘‘Nonreligious organizations’’ encompass a broad variety of types: sport or
recreational; art, music, or educational; labor unions; political parties; environmen-
tal; professional; humanitarian or charitable; consumer; self-help or mutual aid;
plus other.
25. The question as reported in the WVS questionnaire is ‘‘Apart from wed-
dings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services
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Columns (1)–(3) show no significant effect of increased Ramadan
fasting on attendance, whether measured by a dummy equal to 1
if the individual attends religious services at least once a month, a
dummy for attendance more than once a week, or an attendance
Likert scale.
This may look at odds with the negative effect on member-
ship, but in fact the club good framework would lead us to expect a
heterogeneous pattern, according to the degree of commitment
that one might expect from each individual. Specifically, the
framework would naturally predict that the individuals who
are screened by the costly practice will reduce their engagement.
In contrast, it predicts that those who remain committed to the
group may actually increase their engagement with in-group ac-
tivities, as the reduction in free-riding will make participation
more appealing.26
In the Iannaccone (1992) model, the heterogeneity is driven
by individual preferences for religious versus nonreligious activ-
ities, which in turn make them more of less committed to the
religious ‘‘club.’’ To capture these deep preferences in our data,
we exploit a principal component analysis of active membership
in religious organizations, nonreligious organization, and atten-
dance at mosques. To avoid the obvious issue that this measure
of commitment is based on endogenous decisions, we instead
use the predicted value of the first principal component from a
regression on individual demographic characteristics (plus
Muslim population share, and country and year fixed effects).
We then split the sample into three terciles, which we refer
to as ‘‘high-commitment,’’ ‘‘medium-commitment,’’ and ‘‘low-
commitment’’ individuals, and consider whether the absence of
an average effect is indeed masking heterogeneity across these
different groups.
these days?’’ It offers eight possible responses on a Likert scale: ‘‘More than once a
week,’’ ‘‘Once a week,’’ ‘‘Once a month,’’ ‘‘Only on special holy days/Christmas/
Easter days,’’ ‘‘Other specific holy days,’’ ‘‘Once a year,’’ ‘‘Less often,’’ ‘‘Never/
practically never.’’ It is worth noting that there are some differences across coun-
tries in the way the question is translated and asked. For instance, while in Morocco
or Turkey the question asks specifically about mosque attendance, in Indonesia the
translation speaks of ‘‘practicing religious traditions’’ (Fish 2011, p. 41). To the
extent that these differences lead to differences in the scaling of participation,
they will be absorbed by the country fixed effects.
26. In Iannaccone’s words: ‘‘Levels of participation and levels of ‘sacrifice’ de-
manded by religious groups will be correlated’’ (Iannaccone, 1992, p. 285).
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Column (4) in Table IV shows a negative main effect of fast-
ing hours, which, since the low-commitment dummy interaction
is omitted, means that those individuals who are predicted to be
less committed actually reduce their likelihood of attending a
mosque at least once a month. Column (5) then turns to the
higher end of the attendance spectrum, considering at least
weekly attendance. Here we see a main effect of strictness that
is relatively small and statistically insignificant, in contrast with
significantly positive coefficients for the interactions with the
high and medium commitment dummies. The absence of an
effect for low-commitment individuals is rather unsurprising
given that those individuals were relatively unlikely to go the
mosque that often in the first place. The interaction effects, in
contrast, suggest that those who are predicted to be more com-
mitted increase their relative level of attendance as a result of the
increased strictness. In short, the individuals who are more likely
to be committed to religious groups increase their mosque
attendance compared with those who are least likely to be
committed.27
Column (6) shows the ordered logit results for a Likert scale
of attendance responses, with similar results. In this case, for the
group with high commitment, we can further reject that the sum
of main coefficient and interaction coefficient is zero, suggesting
an absolute increase in engagement for the more committed
individuals.
In sum, the absence of an average effect on attendance masks
a heterogeneous impact of the increased strictness of Ramadan
fasting according to the degree of predicted religious commit-
ment. The evidence is thus consistent with a picture in which
the stricter fasting requirement induces less committed individ-
uals to disengage with religious activity.28 The more committed,
in contrast, do not decrease their participation in religious
27. As it happens, and unsurprisingly, the latter are exactly the ones who are
more likely to become members of other kinds of voluntary organizations, in re-
sponse to increased fasting requirements (available on request).
28. Note that this mechanism is not predicated on the idea that less committed
individuals stop fasting when the requirement becomes more burdensome. For
instance, it could be the case that they still fast, but become less inclined to go to
the mosque for tarawih prayers in the evening—perhaps feeling that the increased
fasting and reduced sleep hours are already enough—and this in turn has a persis-
tent effect on mosque attendance.
RELIGION, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND HAPPINESS 647
T
A
B
L
E
V
T
H
E
E
F
F
E
C
T
S
O
N
B
E
L
IE
F
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
R
el
ig
io
u
s
b
el
ie
fs
G
od
H
ea
v
en
H
el
l
A
ft
er
li
fe
S
ou
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
b
el
ie
fs
G
en
er
a
li
ze
d
tr
u
st
,
d
u
m
m
y
L
og
(R
a
m
a
d
a
n
h
ou
rs
)
0
.0
2
4
0
.0
4
9
0
.1
2
3
0
.2
2
0
0
.0
2
7
0
.0
1
2
0
.4
5
**
0
.4
4
**
0
.4
3
**
*
(0
.0
5
8
)
(0
.1
0
3
)
(0
.2
4
1
)
(0
.1
4
4
)
(0
.0
6
9
)
(0
.1
2
0
)
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.1
4
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
on
s
4
7
,8
9
6
2
9
,6
0
8
4
7
,1
9
6
2
9
,5
8
9
2
9
,7
3
6
2
9
,1
3
9
6
8
,6
2
5
6
7
,3
8
5
6
7
,3
8
5
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.0
6
0
.2
8
0
.2
3
0
.2
9
0
.1
7
0
.3
1
0
.1
1
0
.1
1
0
.1
2
C
ou
n
tr
y
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
B
a
se
li
n
e
co
n
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
A
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
co
n
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
N
o
Y
es
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
ef
fe
ct
0
.0
3
0
.0
1
0
.0
6
0
.0
5
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.1
3
0
.1
3
0
.1
2
N
ot
es
.
In
d
iv
id
u
a
l-
le
v
el
ou
tc
om
e
d
a
ta
fr
om
th
e
W
or
ld
V
a
lu
es
S
u
rv
ey
,
1
9
8
1
–
2
0
1
4
.
A
ll
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
in
th
e
sa
m
p
le
a
re
M
u
sl
im
s,
fr
om
a
ll
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
in
th
e
d
a
ta
.
R
a
m
a
d
a
n
h
ou
rs
is
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
su
n
ri
se
to
su
n
se
t
h
ou
rs
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
m
on
th
of
R
a
m
a
d
a
n
in
th
e
y
ea
r
p
re
ce
d
in
g
th
e
su
rv
ey
,
in
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
’s
ca
p
it
a
l.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
:
in
co
lu
m
n
s
(1
)–
(5
)
d
u
m
m
ie
s
in
d
ic
a
ti
n
g
if
th
e
a
n
sw
er
is
y
es
to
th
e
q
u
es
ti
on
‘‘W
h
ic
h
,
if
a
n
y
,
of
th
e
fo
ll
ow
in
g
d
o
y
ou
b
el
ie
v
e
in
?’
’
a
n
d
0
ot
h
er
w
is
e
(N
o
or
D
on
’t
K
n
ow
);
in
co
lu
m
n
(6
)
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
v
a
lu
e
of
th
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
cr
os
s
th
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(G
od
,
H
ea
v
en
,
H
el
l,
A
ft
er
li
fe
,
P
eo
p
le
H
a
v
e
a
S
ou
l)
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
(7
)–
(9
),
th
e
ou
tc
om
e
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
in
d
ic
a
ti
n
g
a
p
os
it
iv
e
a
n
sw
er
to
th
e
q
u
es
ti
on
‘‘G
en
er
a
ll
y
sp
ea
k
in
g
,
w
ou
ld
y
ou
sa
y
th
a
t
m
os
t
p
eo
p
le
ca
n
b
e
tr
u
st
ed
or
th
a
t
y
ou
n
ee
d
to
b
e
v
er
y
ca
re
fu
l
in
d
ea
li
n
g
w
it
h
p
eo
p
le
?’
’T
h
e
b
a
se
li
n
e
co
n
tr
ol
s
a
re
a
g
e,
a
g
e
sq
u
a
re
d
,
n
u
m
b
er
of
ch
il
d
re
n
,
m
a
ri
ta
l
st
a
tu
s
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
ed
u
ca
ti
on
le
v
el
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
a
n
d
a
g
en
d
er
d
u
m
m
y
.
T
h
e
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
co
n
tr
ol
s
a
re
d
u
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
so
ci
a
l
cl
a
ss
(u
p
p
er
cl
a
ss
,
u
p
p
er
m
id
d
le
cl
a
ss
,
lo
w
er
m
id
d
le
cl
a
ss
,
w
or
k
in
g
cl
a
ss
,
lo
w
er
cl
a
ss
),
in
co
m
e
cl
a
ss
(1
0
st
ep
s)
,
a
n
d
p
op
u
la
ti
on
si
ze
of
to
w
n
of
re
si
d
en
ce
(e
ig
h
t
ca
te
g
or
ie
s)
.
R
ob
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
le
v
el
.
**
*
p
<
.0
1
,
**
p
<
.0
5
,
*
p
<
.1
.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS648
activities and may actually increase it, just as we would expect
from the club good framework.29
Beliefs. We can also ask whether the changing patterns of
religious engagement that we have documented induce changes
in individual beliefs. This is a question that is very natural, as we
can conceptualize religious activities as an input in the produc-
tion of beliefs, as well as important from an economic perspective,
as many of these can have implications for economic behavior and
outcomes (Barro and McCleary 2003).
We present the results in Table V. A natural starting point is
to look at the specifically religious domain, about which we can
also find information in the WVS. Columns (1)–(5) display the
results for a set of such questions, ranging from belief in God to
belief in heaven. We find no evidence of an effect of increased
Ramadan fasting requirements over the prevalence of any of
these religious beliefs, nor on the average over the different
kinds (column (6)). Given that these beliefs are very strong
among Muslims—for instance, in the WVS 99% report to believe
in God, and 92% reportedly believe in heaven—the absence of
significant effects of increased strictness is arguably rather
unsurprising.
However, religious beliefs are not the only domain affected by
the practice of organized religion. In fact, a large part of the
impact of membership in religious organizations and engagement
in religious activities may be associated with religious socializa-
tion and its effects on the formation of beliefs (Putnam and
Campbell 2010). We thus look at WVS responses regarding a cen-
tral kind of belief that has been widely studied in connection with
socialization and social capital: generalized trust (e.g., Putnam
1995). This is captured by the standard question (‘‘Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you need to be very careful in dealing with people?’’), and we code
a dummy taking the value of 1 if the answer is ‘‘Most people can
be trusted,’’ as opposed to ‘‘Can’t be too careful.’’
29. We find a positive effect of increased strictness on SWB across all categories
of religious commitment (available on request). We may thus speculate that the
increase in SWB could partly be the result of the reduced free-riding problem among
practicing religious individuals, and perhaps of a better match in which those less
inclined to take part in religious activities sort themselves into less demanding
groups.
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Columns (7)–(9) in Table V show that longer Ramadan fast-
ing actually has a significant negative effect on generalized trust,
with and without the different sets of demographic controls. The
estimate is of a similar magnitude of the one for membership in
religious organizations (Table III). This result is particularly in-
teresting since, when it comes to socialization, our evidence
has suggested that the individuals who left religious organiza-
tions as a result of the increased strictness largely joined nonre-
ligious ‘‘clubs’’ instead. This would seem reassuring from the
standpoint of overall levels of social capital, as the propensity
toward civic engagement in voluntary organizations is largely
unaltered. This conclusion, however, would rely on assuming
that different types of organizations are essentially interchange-
able in their ability to generate the kinds of things we associate
with social capital.
Although we cannot rule out other possible mechanisms,
such as a direct effect of lower GDP growth on trust, our find-
ings are instead consistent with the possibility that religious
organizations may be more effective in producing generalized
trust.30 That being the case, the screening role played by costly
practices in that sense may have a negative side effect on gener-
alized trust, to the extent that those driven away by those prac-
tices may then select into groups that are less effective in that
regard.
In sum, we find evidence that the increased strictness of
fasting requirements has an effect on beliefs and attitudes, not
so much in the strictly religious domain, but likely as a result of
their impact on patterns of socialization.
V.B. Productivity and Labor Supply
Besides the nature of the effects of costly religious practices,
a related issue is what exactly lies behind the economic costs of
the increased fasting requirements. In short, the question is
whether the effects on economic growth stem from the impact of
Ramadan on productivity or on input supply decisions.
30. This is consistent with the empirical literature that has found a positive
correlation between religiosity and trust (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2003;
Putnam and Campbell 2010). It also relates to the long tradition linking religion
and the emergence of intra-group trust (e.g. Sosis 2005), though in our case it is not
obvious how we should define the relevant groups in that regard – Muslims vs non-
Muslims, observant vs non-observant, etc.
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Broadly speaking, when it comes to inputs, religious prac-
tices impose an immediate trade-off, to the extent that they re-
quire time and resources that are then unavailable for producing
output. Going to the temple or on pilgrimages, taking time to pray
or meditate or to study sacred books, spending money on religious
rituals will all take away from what is devoted to (materially)
productive work. Similarly, those practices could affect produc-
tivity as well: from facilitating or limiting social interactions with
correligionists and outsiders (Iannaccone 1992) to purely physio-
logical effects (e.g., dietary restrictions).
In the case of Ramadan, we have argued that the holy month
involves a number of activities that evidently fit that pattern of
competing for time and resources, thereby potentially affecting
input supply. By the same token, there are physiological costs
associated with fasting. Although this could be mitigated by a
positive effect on productivity arising from increased networking
and socializing, it is natural to posit that more intense Ramadan
fasting would have a negative direct impact on labor productivity.
Both channels would explain a negative effect of more intense
fasting on economic activity during the month of Ramadan
itself, consistent with the anecdotal perception of a general
slowdown.
This immediate impact of Ramadan could in and of itself ex-
plain the negative effect on yearly GDP growth numbers. It would
at the very least suggest that individuals fail to fully compensate
for a month of especially intense Ramadan fasting by increasing
economic activity over the rest of the year, in spite of the fact that
the variation in Ramadan fasting hours is entirely predictable.31
Still, it could well be the case that the intensity of Ramadan
fasting entails longer-lasting effects that spill over beyond the
month, presumably through the impact of the religious practice
(or the experiences associate with it) on preferences, beliefs, and
values that may affect economic decisions (Barro and McCleary
2003). This impact, of course, could operate via input supply de-
cisions, productivity, or both.
31. Higher-frequency data—for instance, quarterly data on industrial produc-
tion, from the Internatonal Financial Statistics—clearly show a drop in production
for Ramadan quarters, with some evidence of a rebound in the quarter that follows.
Unfortunately, there are very few Muslim-majority countries in the data set, and
the variation is not enough to pick up effects of Ramadan hours at that frequency.
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Employment, Wages, and Preferences. To make progress in
distinguishing between the productivity and input supply chan-
nels, we resort to their distinct implications when it comes to
labor markets.32 The labor supply mechanism would obviously
represent a movement of the labor supply curve, as individuals
choose to work less to the benefit of religious engagement. The
productivity mechanism would in turn operate via labor demand,
as a decrease in the marginal productivity of labor. Basic eco-
nomic theory then leads us to expect the first channel to be asso-
ciated with slower employment growth but faster wage growth,
whereas the second channel would imply the former but not the
latter.
For that we turn to the yearly data on wages and employ-
ment in the manufacturing sector, from INDSTAT2 2013 edition,
which covers the 1963–2008 period.33 The data are arranged at
the two-digit level of the International Standard Industrial
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) Revision 3, per-
taining to the manufacturing sector, which comprises 23 indus-
tries. The data are based on surveys of establishments with at
least 5–10 employees (the cut-off varies by country). It includes
the total number of persons employed in each sector and the
wages paid to those persons.34 Since our variation in Ramadan
hours is at the country-year level, we aggregate the sector data to
the country-year level, resulting in an unbalanced panel data set
with 130 countries, on employment (number of workers) and
wage (annual wages per worker) growth.35
32. Obviously, religious practices could also affect the long-run accumulation of
capital, of both the physical and human varieties. We will leave these aside, since
our empirical strategy focuses on short- to medium-run variation. Within this ho-
rizon, it makes sense to take the capital stock as essentially fixed and instead focus
attention on what happens to the supply and demand of labor. In addition, the
Online Appendix shows evidence that the yearly growth rate of the capital stock
does not seem to be affected by Ramadan fasting hours.
33. Version 8.0 of the Penn World Tables contains, for the first time, data on
employment. However, the data for Africa and the Middle East is actually refering
to the labor force, thus conflating the employed and the unemployed (Inklaar and
Timmer 2013) and rendering it inappropriate for our purposes.
34. The wage data are made up of all payments paid to employees each year,
including bonuses and housing allowances.
35. The data for Azerbaijan in 1992 shows an arguably implausible wage
growth of more than 2,500%, or about 1,200 standard deviations above the mean.
We exclude this observation as it is an extreme outlier.
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The first four columns in Table VI report results on employ-
ment growth, where we find relatively weak evidence of a nega-
tive effect. Columns (5)–(8) in turn present estimates on the
evolution of wages in the manufacturing sector. The point esti-
mates are similar across specifications, statistically significant,
and show a positive effect on wage growth.
These results are subject to a number of limitations. For in-
stance, the restriction to manufacturing and relatively large
firms is bound to provide a very incomplete picture of labor mar-
kets, especially since in the developing world, to which most
Muslim countries can be ascribed, the manufacturing sector is
rather disproportionately concentrated in the relatively small
formal sector. That said, this evidence suggests that decreases
in productivity are unlikely to be the whole story behind the neg-
ative effect on economic growth.
While the negative shock to labor supply would likely be at
least partly related to the short-term effect from Ramadan com-
peting with work activities, we also find evidence that changes in
values and preferences could push in that direction as well. We
show in the Online Appendix that longer Ramadan hours lead
individuals to be less likely to report that work is more important
than religion or leisure, for that matter.
In spite of these results, and regardless of their limitations, it
is clear that lower productivity can also be a partial explanation
for the effects we find. That said, the evidence does suggest that
the impact of Ramadan fasting on productivity goes beyond im-
mediate physiological consequences. In particular, the results re-
garding the effects on generalized trust provide direct evidence of
relevant beliefs and attitudes being affected. These could help us
understand the impact of increased Ramadan fasting beyond the
holy month, especially in light of the evidence linking trust and
economic performance (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997; Knack and
Keefer 2007; Algan and Cahuc 2010; Tabellini 2010), as well as
factors specifically related with productivity, such as the extent of
cooperation and trade (e.g., Tabellini 2008; Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales 2009).
VI. Concluding Remarks
Using idiosyncratic variation induced by the rotating Islamic
calendar and its interaction with country latitude, we established
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causal evidence for a negative effect of the length of Ramadan
fasting requirement on economic growth in Muslim countries.
We also established that this is accompanied by increased levels
of self-reported happiness and life satisfaction among Muslims.
We argued that these results can be interpreted using the stan-
dard club good model of costly religious practices (Iannaccone
1992), and showed evidence consistent with the predictions of
that model. Finally, we discussed the possible channels through
which an increase in fasting requirements affect economic perfor-
mance, such as productivity and labor supply decisions. In par-
ticular, we have shown an impact on beliefs, such as regarding
generalized trust, underscoring the point that the effects we find
go beyond what happens during the holy month itself.
It seems natural to speculate that similar effects could be
detected for other types of costly religious practices, as suggested
by the way our results fit with the standard model. Obviously, our
estimates cannot be directly extrapolated to other practices—
Islamic or non-Islamic—but given that many of them share
common elements, as possible devices for screening and prevent-
ing free-riding, it seems reasonable to expect that they could put
in motion similar mechanisms to the ones our evidence high-
lights. This is a natural question for future research.
Last but not least, our article provides some new insights for
the ongoing debate regarding how to assess the effects of policy
interventions on welfare. Our results identify circumstances in
which GDP growth and SWB are pushed in different directions,
and in so doing they substantiate calls for considering measures
of SWB as important indicators, in addition to standard measures
such as GDP (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009).36
Harvard Kennedy School and National Bureau of
Economic Research
Harvard Kennedy School
Supplementary Material
An Online Appendix for this article can be found at QJE
online (qje.oxfordjournal.org).
36. An example finding a similar disconnect between income and SWB, in a very
different context, can be found in Dorsett and Oswald (2014).
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